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In a cooperative situation the relationships among the agents may cause restrictions
on coalition formation. As the author says, the best studied restrictions arise from
communication and hierarchical relations. The analysis of cooperative games with
a hierarchical structure in the players began with the study of permission structures
(Gilles et al. 1992) and the introduction of games with structures of precedence (Faigle
and Kern 1992). These papers marked two different options to deal with the problem
of restricted cooperation by hierarchies. Over the past 25 years, permission systems
have been developed, generalized and applied in different ways. Increasingly complex
mathematical structures have been used for this. Hence, this survey about the subject
is appropriate and convenient at this moment.
A hierarchical structure represents certain dependency relations among the agents.
Different assumptions can be made about how these relationships restrict the cooper-
ation among the players. In conjunctive permission structures (Gilles et al. 1992) the
active participation of a player within a coalition requires the active participation of
all their predecessors within the coalition. In the disjunctive approach (van den Brink
1997), the active participation of just one of the predecessors is required. An anti-
matroid (Algaba et al. 2004) shows these dependencies by the so called paths of the
players, each i-path for a player i represents a dependency relationship between player
i and the other players in this path. This is actually a partial dependency, because i
can use any i-path to participate in the game. Theorem 7 expresses how permission
structures are extended by antimatroids. Technically, the analysis of games with per-
mission structure is a nice mathematical problem, in the sense that the axiomatizations
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of the values are always natural and reasonable, moreover, they allow to understand
the intervention of the structure in the solution. Later on, local permission structures
(van den Brink and Dietz 2014) separated the idea of authorization and participation.
The three models showed in the paper represent different extensions of hierarchical
structures. This surveymakes clear the evolution of the model and it explains the mean
results. But, for the sake of completeness, two more models should be considered as
extensions of permission structures being hierarchical situations.
Each antimatroid A is identified with an interior operator intA (see in the paper).
This interior operator determines, for each coalition, the largest active subcoalition
into it taking into account the structure. But an interior operator does not necessarily
represent an antimatroid. Derks and Peters (1993) introduced games with restrictions.
Although the context of these games is not the analysis of hierarchical structures,
restrictions are actually interior operators, as long as we admit that the interior of the
grand coalition i not necessarily the grand coalition. Restrictions can be considered as
a generalization of permission structures. A restriction (interior operator) over N is a
mapping ρ : 2N → 2N satisfying for all set E ⊆ N : (1) ρ(E) ⊆ E , (2) ρ(E) ⊆ ρ(F)
if E ⊆ F , and (3) ρ(ρ(E)) = ρ(E). Derks and Peters (1993) considered a restricted
game as vρ(E) = v(ρ(E)) for each game v over N . But the axiomatization of the
value for games with a restriction is not as natural and clear as the axiomatization of
the values for games with permission structure or antimatroid. Moreover, restrictions
were not explained as hierarchical structures.
Recently, Gallardo et al. (2015) have introduced a new extension of permission
structures from interior operators: fuzzy authorization operators. A crisp authorization
operator (a particular case of fuzzy authorization operator, see also Gallardo 2005)
is a monotone mapping that determines a subcoalition for each coalition, namely
A : 2N → 2N satisfying for each E ⊆ N : (1) A(E) ⊆ E and (2) A(E) ⊆ A(F) if
E ⊆ F . Thus authorization operators differ from the interior operators in the property
of idempotence. The restricted game is also defined as vA(E) = v(A(E)). The authors
defined partial dependency and veto power relationships in this newmodel. Therefore,
authorization structures are useful for studying hierarchical situations. Authorization
structures encompass local permission structures and restrictions. Obviously from
now restrictions can be explained as hierarchical structures. Furthermore, the axiom-
atization of the value in Gallardo et al. (2015) is inspired by the axiomatization of the
values for gameswith permission structure.An opening problem is how to discriminate
restrictions into authorization structures by nature reasons.
Finally, I would like to highlight the effort of the author to compare communication
and hierarchical relations. Future research can come from mixed models and their
representation through mathematical structures.
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